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Is there such a thing as an “irrevocable authority”? 
The Queensland Court of Appeal decision of FTV Holdings  Cairns Pty Ltd v Smith [2014] QCA 217 
analysed many issues concerning the enforceability of an  “irrevocable authority” signed by clients 
directed to their solicitors regarding the payment of money to a third party. The action also drew those 
solicitors into the litigation as they acted contrary to that “irrevocable authority” by paying the money 
concerned directly to their clients but upon their clients’ later instructions. The result   probably 
confirmed what many solicitors have believed to be the case for some time but which had never been 
considered in legal analysis in an appellate court. The facts of the case would be common to many day 
to day transactions. 
Facts 
A solicitor acted for clients B and C who owed $200,000 plus interest  to D Ltd.  D Ltd learned that B 
and C were in the process of selling their house. After some negotiation through their respective 
solicitors relating to the repayment of the debt, B and C executed what was expressed to be an 
“irrevocable authority”  which “authorised and directed” the recipient, the solicitors for B and C ,to 
pay the debt plus interest from the proceeds of the sale of the house to  D Ltd’s solicitor’s trust 
account upon settlement. The irrevocable authority was prepared by D Ltd’s solictors and , after some 
immaterial alterations, was signed by B and C and returned to D Ltd who ceased making further 
demands for the payment of the debt.Upon the sale of the house some time later, B and C gave 
instructions to their solicitor ,contrary to the irrevocable authority  signed by them, to pay the balance 
of settlement proceeds ,after discharge  of a bank mortgage, to the credit of B and C’s personal bank 
accounts. This second direction was contained in a letter of instruction to  B and C’s bank relative to 
the release of the mortgage upon settlement of the sale of the house .Prior to the settlement, B and C 
executed a further authority in favour of their solicitor for his professional costs  and local authority 
rates to be paid from the proceeds and verbally revoked their instructions concerning the prior 
“irrevocable authority”. When D Ltd realised that the proceeds of the sale had not been distributed 
according to the irrevocable authority, it issued proceedings against B and C and their solicitor. B and 
C went bankrupt and the action was continued against B and C’s solicitors only  for monies had and 
received by those solicitors for the use of D Ltd. The causes of action were for damages  for breach of 
promise  arising  under s 55 of the Property Law  Act 1974 (Qld) and a claim for equitable 
compensation. 
Analysis  
The judgment of the Court (Holmes JA ,Fraser JA and Ann Lyons J ) was delivered by Fraser JA. The 
causes of action were separately considered and the questions considered by the Court can be 
conveniently separated. 
(a) What was the contractual effect of the signing by B and C and acceptance by D Ltd of the 
irrevocable authority? 
The Court sought to characterise the effect of the irrevocable authority in the contractual sense as 
what might be described in shorthand as a variation of the loan agreement .The authority was prepared 
by D Ltd’s solicitors, and after some immaterial amendment, was signed by B and C. It was not 
expressly directed to B and C’s solicitor by name but nothing was held to turn on this point. If the 
authority had contractual effect as a variation of the loan agreement, such variation had to be 
supported by consideration .Once the authority was signed by B and C , D Ltd  made no further 
demands and did not pursue the claim further pending the settlement of the house sale. In the absence 
of other consideration, D Ltd’s forbearance to sue B and C once the authority was signed  may have 
sufficed .However, the Court found more explicit consideration within the authority itself which 
reduced the interest rate payable under the original loan agreement from 5 % per month to 5 % per 
annum which the Court recognised was a “substantial compromise” made by D Ltd. Thus, the 
irrevocable authority was held to have contractual force between  B and C and D Ltd. 
(b) Was the claim against B and C’s solicitors for money had and received sustainable? 
The court held that to sustain a claim for money had and received  against B and c’s solicitors, it was 
necessary to prove that  those solicitors had expressly or impliedly promised  (as agents for B and C) 
to pay D Ltd. There was no evidence of any express promise. D Ltd claimed that B and C’s solicitors 
conduct in the negotiation and execution of the irrevocable authority on B and C’s behalf was 
sufficient from which to infer that those solicitors had impliedly promised to D Ltd to make the 
payment envisaged by the authority. The Court rejected this construction of the circumstances and 
found that there was nothing in the documentation or the conduct of those solicitors from which 
[personal liability could be sheeted home to those solicitors and that at all times they were clearly 
acting on behalf of B and C as clients. This conclusion was strengthened by the fact that B and C’s 
solicitors neither received any proceeds of sale nor controlled their ultimate destination.  A finding 
otherwise would have placed solicitors in considerable personal jeopardy every time their clients 
breached agreements which the solicitors had negotiated with third parties. 
(c) Was a cause of action under s 55 of the Property Law Act 1974 sustainable against B and C’s 
solicitors? (s 11 Property Law Act 1969 (WA);s 56 Law of Property Act (NT) are in similar 
terms) 
This section gives a third party “beneficiary” rights to sue on a contract where they can show that a 
promisor, for valuable consideration,  has promised to do or not to do something for valuable 
consideration for the benefit of that beneficiary, and upon “acceptance” by the beneficiary  ,the 
promisor is under a duty to perform that promise. The expression “promise” is defined as a promise 
intending to be legally binding upon the promisor  from which an enforceable obligation in favour of 
the beneficiary would arise. Having found that B and C’s solicitors made no enforceable promise to 
pay to D Ltd, the section had no application. 
 
(d) Could the conduct of the solicitors for B and C sustain a claim for equitable compensation 
against those solicitors? 
Although not pleaded at trial, this issue was argued by D Ltd on appeal and considered in dictum by 
Fraser JA. Given this, and its practical implications, the matter warrants consideration in this context. 
To raise a claim for equitable compensation, it would have to be shown that the solicitors for B and C 
were in some fiduciary relationship with D Ltd or that the execution of authority created an equitable 
charge over the available proceeds of settlement which would have become  trust property  in the 
hands of  B and C immediately those proceeds  were realised. As such, the solicitors for B and C ,as 
agents for B and C being involved in the settlement processes ,it was alleged, participated in  B and 
C’s breach of trust under the rule in  Barnes v Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244 by permitting the 
payment of those proceeds to B and C personally. This rule of longstanding creates  liability  in two 
ways to raise liability in  a third party allegedly complicit in  a breach of trust.  
These can be briefly described as by way of “knowing receipt” of trust property or “knowing 
assistance” to another party who effects a  breach of trust. The Court found that as the solicitors for B 
and C had never received the funds into their trust account they could not be liable under the first limb 
of based upon “knowing receipt.” The question remained whether the complicity of the solicitors in 
following the instructions of their clients B and C knowingly gave B and C “knowing assistance” to 
breach any alleged fiduciary obligation to D Ltd .In respect of this possible head of liability, D Ltd 
argued (only upon appeal)that  the following conduct of B and C’s solicitors constituted  “knowing 
assistance”, that is to say, 
1. the solicitors knew D Ltd had compromised its claim (reduction of interest) by accepting 
the irrevocable authority; 
2. the solicitors accepted  and acted upon contrary instructions of B and C prior to 
completion; 
3. the solicitors accepted instructions not to communicate the revocation of the authority;and 
 
4.the solicitors complied with  B and C’s instructions not to advise the solicitors for D Ltd of 
the revocation of the authority. 
Fraser JA did not make a finding upon these allegations, principally because they were not pleaded at 
the trial and, as such, the solicitor for B and C had not been given an opportunity to rebut the 
allegations in evidence. It was accepted by all parties ( and the Court) that none of this conduct 
amounted to fraud or dishonesty (although that was not necessary to prove a breach of trust).It is fair 
to say that the question remains open.  
Conclusions 
This decision should be of great interest to practising solicitors. Respectfully, it is submitted that the 
decision is correct. Had it been otherwise ,it would be a grave cause for concern  for practising 
solicitors and would limit their ability to act lawfully on behalf of clients. It would have placed  
solicitors  in danger of being drawn into the web of their own client’s liability for simply following 
perfectly proper instructions which ultimately ,as they commonly do, might have led to a breach of 
contract. An irrevocable authority to pay (or direct payment) signed by clients in the course of a 
transaction directed at their solicitors, although having contractual force as far as the client is 
concerned, does not have the force of an undertaking by those solicitors  to pay the creditor . A client 
is free to change instructions which might expose the client to a breach of contract and, providing the 
client’s conduct does not involve dishonesty, the solicitor is bound to carry out those instructions. 
Although the the issue of whether B and C’s solicitors breached the second limb of Barnes v Addy 
was not decided, Fraser JA raised some interesting points in dictum but final resolution of this 
question remains for another day. This, notwithstanding, this case repays the consideration by all 
practising solicitors. 
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